

# Mexico's Virgin, Peru's Utopia: An Essay in Comparative Ethnohistory

Peter Rogers  
History Department  
Simon Fraser University

In Mexico one does not find a historical memory such as exists in the Andes. There is no Aztec utopia. The place which here [in Peru] is occupied by the imperial past and the ancient monarchs, there belongs to the Virgin of Guadalupe.

Alberto Flores Galindo

## I. Introduction: Posing a Paradox

PRIOR TO THE SPANISH CONQUEST of the sixteenth century, Mexico and Peru were, as everyone knows, the sites of the Aztec and Inca empires: the wealthiest, most socially complex and geographically extensive historical systems in the New World. Subsequently they would become the crown jewels of imperial Spain, sources of the seemingly inexhaustible colonial revenues that made her, for a time, the pre-eminent power in Europe and the envy of the world. In both regions, the Spanish invaders inserted themselves into redistributive systems which they found already in place, at first merely usurping the positions of the Amerindian overlords they had defeated, and, with the collusion of native aristocrats, making use of indigenous political structures and modes of production in order to exact tribute and labor services from their new subjects. Partly as a result of this Spanish reliance on aboriginal forms of organization, and partly owing to their intrinsic cohesiveness and political tenacity, native communities in both regions (the Mexican *calpulli*, the Peruvian *ayllu*) retained many of their prehispanic characteristics—cultural, linguistic, socio-economic, technological—throughout the colonial period, and in some regions continue to do so even at the present day.

Despite this common heritage, however, when we turn our attention to the contemporary republics, it is the contrasts rather than the similarities which leap to the eye. Since the consolidation of the regime emerging from its great social revolution of 1910-1920, Mexico has evinced a political stability unparalleled in Latin America, as well as a degree of economic prosperity which is likewise exceptional by regional standards (although the inegalitarian pattern of distribution is not).<sup>1</sup> During the middle decades of the twentieth century, the corporative processes of state- and

nation-building, centered ideologically on the themes of *mestizaje* and *indigenismo*,<sup>2</sup> accomplished a national hegemony so pervasive that even the radical left, whether in its official Communist or its Lombardista variant, generally preferred to collaborate with the existing regime rather than attempting to replace it.<sup>3</sup> Peru meanwhile has languished on the continental sick list, its economy subject to recurrent cycles of boom and bust, its indigenous majority dangerously alienated from the mestizo-dominated state, its political process punctuated at frequent intervals by coups and insurrections. The closest Peruvian parallel to Mexico's social revolution was the so-called "military revolution" of 1968, in which a junta of young army officers with left-wing nationalist propensities attempted to unify and modernize the country via a program of industrialization, collectivist land reforms, and Indianist propaganda. An ill-considered adventure with minimal grassroots support, the effort fizzled after a few years, achieving neither its economic nor its political objectives and bequeathing to the current generation a legacy of frustrated ambitions and broken promises.

Seldom has the fragility of the Peruvian state been more evident than in the current conjuncture, framed by the debt crisis of the 1980s, inflation which spiraled past 7000% in 1990 and was only brought down to the "tolerable" range of around 50% annually by means of draconian economic policies instituted under martial law, a guerrilla insurgency which spread from the Andean highlands to the capital and has only somewhat subsided following the capture and imprisonment of its central leader; the *autogolpe* (self-imposed coup) of April 1992, which ended Peru's twelve-year experiment in electoral democracy, and the ensuing quasi-legal rule by a president who has replaced the previous constitution and parliament with new ones instituted under his own autocratic terms. In a speech delivered to the Democratic Constituent Congress on 28 July 1993—Peruvian Independence Day—the best that President Alberto Fujimori could find to say in defense of his assumption of dictatorial powers was that he had succeeded in turning Peru from a land of lost opportunities into "a feasible, possible country."<sup>4</sup> Even this modest claim may well ring hollow to the 85% of Peruvians who are currently un- or underemployed—and especially to the two out of three who, according to the government's own reckoning, live in critical poverty.<sup>5</sup>

Encapsulating these contrasts in a single image, Florencia E. Mallon has recently compared Sendero Luminoso's uncompromising civil war to the constitutionalist approach favored by Mexico's left-wing opposition, headed by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, presidential candidate in the 1988 and 1994 elections. The former repudiates the entire history of both civil and military government in Peru and proposes to destroy the existing state by violence; the latter affirms the same political tradition as does the ruling Revolutionary Institutional Party (of which it is indeed an offshoot, Cárdenas being a former member and the son of a former president), disputing only the sincerity of its pretensions. "For Cárdenas," Mallon notes,

the conflict is over what the hegemonic legacy really means. For Sendero, it is about the total bankruptcy of the Peruvian State. In Puebla and Morelos in 1988, villagers fought about the legitimacy of the process through which their votes were counted; in the early 1990s, they struggle over the true meaning of the agrarian legacy of 1910. In Junín and Ayacucho, the struggles between Senderistas and the anti-Senderista village militias called *rondas* continue to reproduce the figure of the ever-vigilant guerrilla, eternally on the margins of a nonexistent nation.<sup>6</sup>

These observations were evidently set down before the outbreak of the Mayan insurrection in Chiapas on 1 January 1994. This uprising and the massive popular sympathy it has evoked (up to 70% of Mexicans supported the rebels' demands, according to public opinion polls), along with the regime's increasing recourse in recent decades to electoral fraud and political repression, would seem to constitute persuasive evidence that the hegemonic system elaborated during and after the Mexican Revolution is beginning to come unraveled—thus apparently dulling the edges of the contrast formulated by Mallon. Nonetheless, if one wanted to conjure up a guerrilla movement at the diametrically extreme remove from Sendero Luminoso, the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) would serve the purpose quite elegantly. So far from endorsing the Maoist perspective of "prolonged popular warfare," the Zapatistas agreed to a truce at the earliest opportunity and settled down to negotiations with the government. "What distinguishes the EZLN from its predecessors is that it is not bent on taking power in Mexico City, nor is it calling for state socialism. Its objective is to spark a broad-based movement of civil society in Chiapas and the rest of Mexico that will transform the country from the bottom up."<sup>7</sup> The Zapatistas, in other words, do not contemplate a further revolution so much as a revitalization of the last. Indeed, the Clandestine Indigenous Committee which speaks for the rebels has inserted itself forthrightly in the tradition, not only of Emiliano Zapata, but even of Father Miguel Hidalgo and President Benito Juárez. In common with Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, who has declared his agreement with the guerrillas' goals if not their methods, the EZLN proposes to reknit the threads of Mexican history, not to discard the old *sarape*—however badly frayed and discolored—in favor of a new one.

The historical antithesis we are discussing can also be posed in terms of mestizaje and the project of constructing a national identity, a project at which, Mallon argues, Mexican elites have largely succeeded, while their Peruvian counterparts have failed. Thus, the central regions of Mexico in which the bulk of the population lives are officially defined—and, more importantly, widely perceived—as mestizo: the 1970 census defined only 7.8% of Mexico's population as Indian,<sup>8</sup> and further classified this minority into 59 separate linguistic groups. "Geographically and politically speaking, the Indian population tended to inhabit the periphery of the country...[T]he country's central Nahua zone was not considered Indian." By contrast, "the Peruvian state has been unable to centralise its power through a unifying process of mestizaje, and has not relegated the Indian to the country's periphery. Instead, the political construction of 'Indianness' has been a bipolar one: Indian highlands, white and mestizo coast; white and mestizo cities, Indian countryside. In this context, mestizaje separates rather than unites the population: the *misti*, or highland mestizo, is a figure signifying domination."<sup>9</sup>

Having thus constituted a historical paradox, Mallon then seeks an appropriate framework within which to attempt its resolution, casting her net very widely at first: "Starting from a common past in Spanish conquest, how do we explain these differences? Do they have profound roots in the indigenous cultures themselves, and in the conquest and colonisation processes, or are they the result of more recent, perhaps even twentieth-century political changes?" In her judgement the solution must be sought "in a dialectic between colonial ethnic patterns, and an examination of more recent historical processes."<sup>10</sup> In practice, however, she confines her analysis to the period beginning in 1780 with the rebellion of Tupac Amaru II.<sup>11</sup> The possibility of these latter-day developments having "profound roots in the indigenous cultures themselves" is not explicitly rejected, but neither is it explored: it remains no

more than a tantalizing suggestion. It is this suggestion which will be taken up in the present essay.

## II. Framing an Explanation

As it happens, Mallon was by no means the first to notice this historical discrepancy between centralism in Mexico and dualism in Peru. As early as 1927, the Peruvian populist Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre had observed:

In Mexico the races have mixed together and the new capital was built in the same place as the old. Mexico City and all of the country's large cities are located in the heart of the country, in the mountains, on the high plateaus that are crowned with volcanoes. The tropical coast serves for communication with the sea. The conquistador in Mexico fused with the Indian, became one with him in the very heart of his sierras, and forged a race which, though not absolutely a race in the strict sense of the word, is one nevertheless because of the homogeneity of its customs, the tendency toward a complete mingling of blood, and the continuity, without violent solutions, of the national ambiance. That never happened in Peru. Indigenous, mountain Peru, the real Peru, lay beyond the western Andes. The old national cities—Cuzco, Cajamarca, et cetera—were disregarded. New and Spanish cities were built on the tropical coast where it never rains, where there are no changes of temperature, where that sensual, Andalusian atmosphere of our gay and submissive capital could develop.<sup>12</sup>

To be sure, such effusions can hardly be accepted at face value; at all events, not without discounting heavily for the romantic and credulous attitude toward Mexican history which they so charmingly exhibit. (The muddle-headed observations about race, typical of the period, are best passed over in silence now that the illusion of "race in the strict sense of the word"—i.e., race as a category of scientific analysis—has been persuasively controverted.<sup>13</sup>) Mexicans who still bore the scars, both literal and figurative, of their recent, bloody, revolutionary past would doubtless have been perplexed to learn that their nation had wisely abstained from "violent solutions." Nor would Haya's envious reference to Mexico's "homogeneity" have stilled the anxieties of bourgeois nationalists, such as the celebrated anthropologist Manuel Gamio, who were fretting precisely over her cultural and linguistic *beterogeneity*, and therefore busied themselves formulating indigenista projects of education and acculturation, designed to force the pace of *mestizaje* which they considered to have been all too desultory theretofore.<sup>14</sup> Such quibbles aside, however, the germ of truth in Haya's meditation remains inescapable. There do appear to have been marked differences between the patterns of colonization that were manifested in Mexico and Peru, differences which date from the sixteenth rather than the eighteenth century, from the beginning of the colonial era rather than its end.

Moreover, these differences are all the more apparent when we turn our attention to the Amerindian side of the two scenarios of conquest. If the decisions and actions of Peru's colonizers diverged from those of their counterparts in Mexico, those of the colonized diverged no less widely, and they began diverging earlier. After all, Francisco Pizarro's opening moves in the Peruvian chess game—the display of armored cavalry to create the impression of invulnerability, the staging of

massacres to instill terror and demonstrate the superiority of Spanish arms, the desecration of indigenous temples to undermine the authority of the state religion, even the capture of the emperor and demand for a princely ransom—were scarcely distinguishable from (and were indeed modeled on) those which had succeeded so splendidly for Hernán Cortés in Mexico. If the game subsequently proceeded along different lines, this was not because the Spaniards took a notion, one fine morning, to alter their plans. Alter them they undoubtedly did, but only in response to innovations originating on the other side. Even the best of chess players—*especially* the best of chess players—will reconsider her strategy when the opponent makes an unexpected move. It will be argued below that Andeans were very different opponents from Mexicans and repeatedly made moves which had not occurred to the latter. The distinct historical destinies of Mexico and Peru cannot be comprehended, therefore, within a time-frame that begins with the Spanish conquest, let alone one that begins with the crisis of colonialism at the close of the eighteenth century. My working hypothesis will be that the process of differentiation was well under way during the precolumbian histories of Anáhuac and Tahuantinsuyu.<sup>15</sup> Its explanation must accordingly proceed from an analysis of the character of Mexican and Andean politics, and especially of the Aztec and Inca states, before the conquest.

These social formations, I will argue, had several features in common. Indeed, they were historical systems of the same general type, which I shall call tributary systems or tribute-empires.<sup>16</sup> That general category, however, can be internally subdivided along a number of axes—tribute in kind versus tribute in the form of labor, relative meanness versus relative extravagance in the “department of public works” (to borrow Frederick Engels’s phrase), militaristic reign of terror versus hegemonic rule by consent—and on each of these (manifestly inter-related) poles the Aztecs and the Incas were far apart. This conceptual framework will be elaborated presently. Before proceeding to explanations, however, it will be appropriate to examine more closely the phenomena which are to be explained. We return, therefore, to the parallel but dissimilar experiences of conquest in the two countries, and more particularly to the initiatives—the chess moves, to revert to our earlier metaphor—undertaken by the Amerindian side.

The Spanish conquest was from the beginning not just a military but also an ideological campaign. On both fronts, the Peruvian experience differed from the Mexican, and in the same respect: Mexican capitulation came early (although in some respects, at least as far as the “spiritual conquest” is concerned, it would prove more apparent than real, a point to which we shall return). Andean resistance, as regards both the war of arms and the war of ideas, was noticeably more concerted and prolonged.

With his contingent of five hundred Spanish soldiers of fortune, sixteen horses, and some dogs, Cortés landed on Mexico’s Gulf Coast in April, 1519, where he founded the “Rich City of the True Cross” (Veracruz). Two years and four months later he was in command of an empire stretching from the Pacific ocean to the Gulf of Mexico, an empire which his predecessors the Aztecs (also known as the Mexica, whence the name of the modern republic) had required approximately a century to conquer. The sacking of the capital Tenochtitlan signaled the immediate and total collapse of Aztec authority throughout their former domains; their fragile alliances had evaporated overnight, whereas the Spaniards’ Tlaxcalan allies remained loyal even though they received only a nominal share in the spoils. There was to be no further military resistance to Spanish rule in central Mexico, a region which had known endemic warfare between rival empires and city-states for hundreds of years.

All this is in striking contrast to the situation in Peru, where the conquest turned out to be a considerably more protracted affair. Like Cortés, Pizarro took advantage of divisions between rival Indian factions. In fact, his situation was in one important respect more propitious, since he had arrived in the Andes just as the Incas were engaged in an internecine war over the royal succession. One of the claimants, the Inca Atahualpa, had defeated and captured his brother Huascar shortly before the Spaniards' arrival, and Pizarro was able to enlist some of Huascar's vengeful allies in his assault on Cuzco, the Inca capital. Having kidnapped Atahualpa in a bold, treacherous, and extremely bloody ambush (in which 1,500 Indians but not a single European died), having received a ransom in gold and silver which exceeded even the legendary booty Cortés had exacted from Moctezuma, Pizarro nonetheless proceeded to execute his captive and install a puppet emperor in his place. Manco Inca, however, proved an ill-chosen and reluctant marionette, who soon wearied of his purely ceremonial role. Escaping to the mountains northwest of Cuzco, he managed in short order to organize an armed insurrection against the Europeans across much of the Inca highlands, uniting the rival factions in the recent aboriginal civil war. With an army of perhaps 100,000 Manco laid siege to Cuzco for ten months in 1536-1537, while his lieutenants organized assaults on other Spanish settlements, including Pizarro's newly-founded Ciudad de los Reyes (today's Lima) on the coast. While his forces were victorious in a number of engagements with the Spaniards, the Inca's fractured tributary system was no longer capable of sustaining prolonged military campaigns. His peasant army began to melt away as the planting season approached, and he was forced to lift his siege of the highland capital. On the eve of his retreat, Manco delivered a speech to his followers which has set the tone of inter-ethnic relations in the Andes up to the present day:

What you can do is give them the outward appearance of complying with their demands. And give them a little tribute, whatever you can spare...

I know that someday, by force or deceit, they will make you worship what they worship, and when that happens, when you can resist no longer, do it in front of them, but on the other hand do not forget our ceremonies. And if they tell you to break your shrines, and force you to do so, reveal just what you have to, and keep hidden the rest.<sup>17</sup>

Withdrawing to the remote valley of Vilcabamba, Manco established what historians have dubbed the "neo-Inca state": a government-in-exile which maintained its sovereignty for nearly forty years, launching repeated raids into the Spanish-held provinces, inspiring numerous local rebellions, and even attracting old enemies like the Huancas (who at first had sided with the Spaniards) to their cause.<sup>18</sup>

### **III. The Holy Madonna, Mexican-Style**

Turning from the military to the ideological front, we encounter a similar contrast: ready and even eager conversion to Christianity in central Mexico, lingering intransigence in Peru. In the view of one recent authority, the Indians of central Mexico by and large accepted Cortés's victory as "prima facie evidence of the strength of the victor's god." Although "conscious, overt indigenous resistance was not utterly lacking from the picture," it was neither organized nor widespread. "One

can hardly speak of an indigenous inclination to disbelief in Christianity....[T]he Nahuas after the Spanish conquest needed less to be converted than to be instructed."<sup>19</sup> Certainly this was the view of the early European missionaries, who were positively euphoric over the facility and speed with which they were saving Indian souls. As Fray Pedro de Gante remarked in 1529:

And now, thanks to the Lord, many have begun to follow the natural order, and having already converted to Christianity, with great longing they seek out baptism and confess their sins.

In this province of Mexico I have baptized, with other companions, more than two hundred thousand, indeed so many that I myself do not know the number. Frequently it happens that we baptize fourteen thousand people in a day, sometimes ten, sometimes eight thousand.<sup>20</sup>

By 1536 another friar, Toribio de Benavente Motolinía, confidently calculated that "more than nine million souls of the Indians" had accepted baptism in the scant fifteen years since the conquest.<sup>21</sup>

Not only was the quantity of conversions gratifying to these early evangelists, but the quality as well, as can be seen from a letter addressed to the Spanish monarch by a monk at the convent of Huexotzinco in 1533:

What shall we say of the children of the natives of this land? They write, read, sing plain chants, and of the organ and counterpoint, they write songbooks and teach others the music; they particularly rejoice in ecclesiastic singing; and preach to the people the sermons that we teach them, and they say them with great spirit; the frequency of the confessions with weeping and tears, the pure and simple confession, and the accompanying penance, *nos qui contractavimus de verbo vitae* [we who made a pact of the word of salvation] know it, and that sovereign Lord, who works hidden miracles in their hearts, knows it...<sup>22</sup>

In the next generation, however, such triumphalism gave way to doubts and reservations, as friars writing in the latter half of the sixteenth century began to have second thoughts about the wholesale conversions accomplished by their predecessors. What worried them was not an outright rejection of the Catholic faith, not a resolute return to paganism, but rather the more insidious danger of syncretism. No one expressed these misgivings more cogently than Fray Bernardino de Sahagún, in a much-cited passage from his *Historia general de las cosas de Nueva España*:

[W]ith their sly humility [the Indians] quickly offered themselves to receive the faith that was being preached to them. But they remained deceitful in that they did not detest or renounce all their gods with all their customs, and thus they were baptized not like perfect believers but as fictitious ones, who received that faith without leaving the false one they had of many gods. This cover-up was not understood in the beginning...

All of us were told...that this people had come to the faith so sincerely and were almost all baptized and so wholly in the Catholic faith of the Roman Church that there was no need to preach against idolatry because they had abandoned it so truly. We accepted this information as very true and miraculous, because in such a short time and with so little preaching and knowledge of the language, and without any miracles, so many people had been converted....It was discovered after a few years [that the natives had conspired] to receive Jesus Christ among their gods as one of them, according to their ancient custom wherein when foreigners arrived to settle near those who were already settled, when it pleased them they would take as a god the one brought by the recently arrived...

In this fashion they easily accepted as a god the god of the Spaniards, but not in order to leave their ancient ones...and thus this new Church was established over a false foundation, and even after having put some buttresses, it is still damaged and ruined.<sup>23</sup>

Further evidence concerning syncretism and its implications, in this case as seen from the indigenous viewpoint, is revealed in the testimony of an Indian elder, as recorded by Fray Diego Durán:

Once when I was questioning an Indian (with good reason) about certain things, particularly about his dragging himself about begging for money, passing bad nights and worse days and, after having collected so much money with so much effort, why he had put on a wedding and invited the whole town and spent everything and, thus, reprehending him for the evil he had done, he responded: "Father, do not be astonished since we are still *nepantla*." And although I understood what he meant by that term and metaphor, which means "to be in the middle," I insisted he tell me what "middle" it was they were in. He answered that since they were not yet well rooted in the faith, I should not be astonished that they were still neutral; that they neither responded to one law nor the other, or, better yet, that they believed in God and at the same time kept their ancient customs and the rites of the devil. And this is what he meant by his abominable excuse that they were still "in the middle and were neutral."<sup>24</sup>

Nowhere is the syncretistic tendency of Mexican Catholicism more evident than in the Indianist cult that would become the very icon of Mexican nationality, that of the Virgin of Guadalupe. For Sahagún, the popularity of the Virgin's shrine at Tepeyac—site of the former temple of the Aztec goddess Tonantzin (and which today perhaps attracts more pilgrims annually than any other Catholic holy place, aside from the Vatican)—was clear circumstantial evidence of the survival of paganism under a Christian veneer:

Around the hills there are three or four places where [the Indians] used to make very solemn sacrifices and they came to these places from distant lands. One of these is here in Mexico, where there is a hill that is called Tepéacac [Tepeyac] and the Spaniards call it Tepeaquilla, and now is called Our Lady of Guadalupe; in this place they had a



temple dedicated to the mother of the gods, whom they called Tonantzin, which means "our Mother"; there they made many sacrifices to honor this goddess and came to her from distant lands from more than twenty leagues, from all the regions of Mexico and they brought many offerings; men and women and young men and young women came to these feasts; there was a great gathering of people on those days and they all said let us go to the feast of Tonantzin; and now that the Church of Our Lady of Guadalupe has been built, the Indians also call her Tonantzin, on the pretext that the preachers call Our Lady, the Mother of God, "Tonantzin"... This is an abuse which should be stopped, for the true name of the Mother of God, Our Lady, is not Tonantzin but *Dios-nantzin* ["God's mother"]. To me this looks very much like a satanic invention to palliate idolatry by playing on the ambiguity of this name Tonantzin. The Indians today, as in the old days, come from afar to visit this Tonantzin, and to me this cult seems very suspect, for there are everywhere numerous churches consecrated to Our Lady, but they do not go there, preferring to come from afar to this Tonantzin, as in the past.<sup>25</sup>

F. Martín de León concurred: "On the hill where Our Lady of Guadalupe is they adored the idol of a goddess they called Tonantzin, which means Our Mother, and this is also the name they give Our Lady and they always say they are going to Tonantzin or they are celebrating Tonantzin and many of them understand this in the old way and not in the modern way."<sup>26</sup>

What de León failed to consider, however, or rather what his Eurocentric spectacles did not allow him to perceive, was a third possibility: namely, that Amerindians might be capable of spiritual synthesis or theological innovation, and might therefore worship neither a Tonantzin imagined "in the old way," nor yet a Virgin of Guadalupe imagined in a way that a sixteenth-century European would deem "modern." With the benefit of hindsight one may reasonably surmise that the Virgin who appeared to the defeated Nahuas, as legend has it, in 1531, was a somewhat novel divinity, one who could speak to them in their contemporary, post-conquest, imperialized condition, and who had come—as she reputedly explained in Nahuatl to the humble *macehualli* (commoner, i.e., member of the lowest and most numerous economic class in prehispanic meso-American society) Juan Diego—"to protect the Indians."

But while Sahagún and the other mendicant friars dreamed of introducing a purified Christianity into the New World, cleansed of all idolatrous and pagan accretions, the secular clergy perforce adopted a less inflexible posture. Thus, the earliest documentary evidence we have of the Mexican Virgin dates from 1554, when Archbishop Alonso de Montufar ordered the rebuilding of her chapel at Tepeyac, dismissed its Franciscan custodians who had allegedly permitted the sanctuary to fall into disrepair, and appointed a secular priest as chaplain. The following year the archbishop returned to Tepeyac to preach a sermon in praise of Our Lady of Guadalupe, noting pointedly that similar Marian cults were after all no less popular in Spain (he referred specifically to Monserrat, Peña de Francia, and, of course, the original Guadalupe).<sup>27</sup> In the event, such calmer, more realistic voices were to prevail; the so-called "spiritual conquest of Mexico"<sup>28</sup> was not destined to result in the definitive victory to which the early mendicants aspired. Mexico would indeed be Christianized, but in the process Christianity would also be Mexicanized.

The result was a *sui generis* Catholicism, a Catholicism no less distinctive and "national," perhaps, than that of many other countries.

The point of this brief exposition has been to show that, even though the Nahua mind was not a blank slate on which the missionaries could inscribe a wholly novel and alien doctrine, neither was it a sealed chamber into which Christian evangelism could not hope to penetrate. The Nahuas sought an accommodation, a *modus vivendi* which would allow them to embrace the new imperial religion without abandoning all continuity with their past traditions. For unbending clerics of Sahagún's persuasion, no such accommodation was admissible: God does not suffer the devil to be worshipped at his side. The *nepantlism*, or search for a middle ground, of the Indian who confided in Father Durán was unthinkable to the monks. But the work-a-day parish priest had little hope of applying such stringent standards, even had he been inclined to do so, which was probably not very often. When his flock spontaneously introduced aboriginal themes into their "Christian" rituals, songs, and processions, he forgot what had been written in a dozen manuals on "the extirpation of idolatries," and complacently looked the other way.

The above account has been explicitly restricted to the Nahua zone or, still more explicitly, to the former territory of the Aztec empire. Amerindians outside that zone were often less accommodating, and at times put up a formidable, even violent resistance to both the civil and the religious authorities of New Spain: witness the Mixtón insurrection in New Galicia in 1541-1542, or that of the Mayas on the Caribbean coast of the Yucatán peninsula in 1546-1547.<sup>29</sup> Both were marked by a reaffirmation of traditional aboriginal beliefs, a radical repudiation of all things Spanish and of Christianity in particular, and a determination to drive the invaders into the sea. In short, they exhibited precisely the sort of nativist millenarianism which we shall momentarily encounter in the Andes. The point to observe here is that these uprisings in frontier regions of New Spain tend rather to confirm than to invalidate the image, adumbrated above, of Mexican centralism/peripheralism *versus* the coast/highlands dualism of Peru.

Conversely, the half-dozen or so recorded attempts to foment anti-Christian rebellion within central Mexico seem to have been relatively inconsequential. To cite only one example, consider the case of Juan Teton, a nativist preacher in the Valley of Mexico who in 1558 called on the villagers of his neighborhood to return to their ancestral faith, ritually washing their heads to symbolize the renunciation of baptism. This invocation was enforced by a warning: the "binding of the years" was approaching, when, at the end of the cycle of 2-Reed according to the Aztec calendar (which would fall in 1559), those who had not "washed their heads" would find themselves transformed into animals. Significantly, our knowledge of this incident is derived from the unpublished diary of a converted Indian, Juan Bautista, who appears to have remained unmoved by the revivalist's message. Here is Bautista's account:

Juan Teton, a neighbor of Michmaloyan, tricked and coaxed those of Coahuatépec and those of Atlapolco, he mocked their baptism....

First he tells them, he tricks them, those of Coahuatépec: listen you, what do you say? Do you know what our grandfathers are saying? When our binding of the years has come there will be total darkness and the *tzitzimime* will descend, they will eat us and there will be transformations. Those who were baptized, those who believed in God, will be changed into something else. He who eats the meat of a

cow will be converted into that; he who eats pork meat, into that will be converted, and will go about dressed in its skin, he who eats the meat of the rooster into that will be converted....

Look at those from Xalatlahuico, those who first believed...All of them were transformed into something else, all went about grazing. They no longer appear in the town where they were, but in the pastures, in the forests is where they are on their feet: they are cows. Now I have fulfilled my responsibility with you; it will not be long before the marvel takes place: if you do not believe what I tell you, then just like them you will be transformed [and] I will make fun of you, because you were baptized.

Bautista then proceeds to cite "the names of those who washed their heads"; precisely five individuals appear on his list, although it may be worth noting that four of these held municipal offices, such as that of judge or *fiscal* (a minor civic official). Thanks to the intervention of "our dear father Pedro Hernández," all were apprehended in 1558, the Nahua diarist recalls with evident satisfaction.<sup>30</sup> With regard to the prophet's admonitions, Bautista's tone throughout is skeptical, perhaps even mildly amused. The ecclesiastical authorities evidently took the matter rather more seriously. Nonetheless, if such were the dimensions assumed by Nahua revivalism, it is hardly surprising that friars like Durán found the "nepantla" fence-sitters a more pressing concern than those who stood their ground defiantly on the other side.

#### IV. Utopia in the Andes

By comparison with the antics of a Juan Teton, the nativist revival movement which swept through the Andes five or six years later—the Taqui Onqoy (literally, "sickness dance")—was definitely no laughing matter. The Andean *wak'as*, divine spirits ordinarily associated with specific mountains, rocks, or springs, suddenly appeared at large among the natives, "entering their bodies, and causing the 'possessed' to shake, tremble, fall, and dance insanely."<sup>31</sup> The adherents of the cult, or *taquiongos*, did more than dance, however; they also preached, and their message was one of uncompromising rejection of the Spanish occupiers and their religion. The *wak'as*, having been insulted and neglected since the conquest, were angry and vengeful: they "were walking about in the air, dried out and starving, because the Indians were not feeding them or pouring *chicha* [maize beer]."<sup>32</sup> Andeans must now return to their ancestral religion, lest dire consequences ensue: "And if they did not adore the *wak'as* and perform the ceremonies and sacrifices...they would die and go about with their heads on the ground and their feet in the air and others would turn into guanacos, deer, and vicuñas and other animals and throw themselves over the cliffs like the wild things they were."<sup>33</sup>

If they were to evade the *wak'as'* wrath, Andeans must not only renounce the Christian gods (God, Jesus, the Virgin Mary and other saints), refrain from entering Catholic churches, and avoid all contact with priests. They must also refuse the labor drafts and tribute payments, and even refrain from the use of Hispanic food or clothing or the taking of Christian names. According to the *taquiongos'* millenarian prophecies, a *pachakuti* ("turning over of the world") was at hand, which was destined to remove every trace of the Spanish presence from Peru: "When the

Marqués [Francisco Pizarro] entered this land, God defeated the wak'as and the Spaniards defeated the Indians. However, now the world has turned about, and this time God and the Spaniards [will be] defeated and all the Spaniards dead and their cities drowned; and the sea will rise and overwhelm them, so that there will remain no memory of them."<sup>34</sup> In a calculated effort to refute the teachings of the Christian missionaries, a group of taquiongos conducted a kind of theological experiment around 1565. A cross was set up beside certain wak'as (in this case, sacred objects), and cultic rituals were then performed. Participants in the ceremony reported that the wak'as "responded" while the cross remained inert, thus demonstrating that "'the [wak'a] who speaks to us is our god and creator,' while the cross was a mere 'stick.'"<sup>35</sup> Evidently, Andeans had their own criteria for distinguishing between idolatry and authentic religion.

The magnitude of the threat to European rule posed by Taqui Onqoy, especially when viewed in conjunction with the contemporaneous armed resistance of the neo-Incas,<sup>36</sup> can be gauged by the depth and breadth of its popular appeal. Indians both young and old, male and female, commoner and *kuraka* (noble or chieftain), proved receptive to the subversive doctrines of the taquiongos, more than half of whom were women. During the investigation conducted by Fray Cristóbal de Albornoz, more than 8,000 people were convicted of active participation in the movement—penalties ranged from compulsory religious instruction thrice weekly for rank-and-file taquiongos to permanent exile for prominent leaders—and many hundreds of native shrines were located and destroyed.<sup>37</sup>

It is in a sort of convergence between the "popular" consciousness of the taquiongos and the "aristocratic" consciousness of the neo-Incas that the late Peruvian historian Alberto Flores Galindo discerned the first tentative signs of that remarkable psychic "amalgam" which he dubbed "the Andean utopia." To the definitive emergence of this new mentality, however, he assigned a somewhat latter date: namely, 1607, which saw the publication in Lisbon of the *Royal Commentaries of the Incas*, masterpiece of the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega.<sup>38</sup>

Few could have been better qualified than Garcilaso to appreciate the contrast between Peru's Inca past and its colonial present, even though he had left the country in 1550 at the age of twenty-one, never to return. His father was a prominent conquistador who served as governor of Cuzco, his mother the Indian princess Isabel Chimu Occllo, grand-daughter of the Emperor Tupac Inca Yupanqui. As a child, therefore, he witnessed at first hand the events of the colonial civil war, the turbulent process whereby Spanish rule was imposed on his native land, with privileged access to both the Indian and the Spanish perspectives. Subsequently, the long years spent in rural isolation in Spain afforded him plenty of opportunity to reflect upon his experiences, as well as to acquire a broad Renaissance education and to keep abreast of whatever literature appeared in the field that concerned him most: that of American history, both pre- and post-conquest.

In D.A. Brading's view, the *Royal Commentaries* constitute "a carefully meditated, sustained rebuttal of the imperial tradition of conquest history."<sup>39</sup> Refuting at every point the colonialist analysis of Andean religion and the Inca state, Garcilaso portrayed the Incas as Platonic philosopher-kings, who discovered through the exercise of their God-given reason both the truths of natural religion and the principles of good government. Contrary to the Spanish missionaries' erroneous perception, he contended that the wak'as did not constitute a polytheistic pantheon, but were merely natural shrines and devotional objects, cherished as representations of the divine rather than being worshipped in their own right.

Garcilaso admitted that prior to the rise of the Inca Empire, Andeans had indeed lived in a state of savagery, practicing "unnatural vices" such as sodomy and cannibalism, which Europeans rightly found abhorrent. But Inca rule had put an end to such practices, and Peruvian natives, he declared, would never forget that it was the Incas (and by implication, therefore, not the Spaniards) who "had rescued them from their wild life and had made them human."<sup>40</sup> Recounting the story of the foundation of the Inca state as he claimed to have heard it from one of his uncles, Garcilaso wrote:

"You should know that...people lived in those times like wild beasts, with no religion or government and no towns or houses, and without tilling or sowing the soil, or clothing or covering their flesh, for they did not know how to weave cotton or wool to make clothes....Like wild beasts they ate the herbs of the field and roots of trees and fruits growing wild and also human flesh....In short, they lived like deer or other game, and even in their intercourse with women they behaved like beasts, for they knew nothing of having separate wives....

"Our father the Sun, seeing men in the state I have mentioned, took pity and was sorry for them, and sent from heaven to earth a son and a daughter of his [i.e. the first Inca monarchs] to indoctrinate them in the knowledge of our father the Sun that they might worship him and adopt him as their god, and to give them precepts and laws by which they would live as reasonable and civilized men, and dwell in houses and settled towns, and learn to till the soil, and grow plants and crops, and breed flocks, and use the fruits of the earth like rational beings and not like beasts. With this order and mandate our father the Sun set these two children of his in Lake Titicaca...

"Finally he told them: 'When you have reduced these people to our service, you shall maintain them in reason and justice, showing mercy, clemency, and mildness, and always treating them as a merciful father treats his beloved and tender children. Imitate my example in this. I do good to all the world. I give them my light and brightness...; I warm them when they are cold; and I grow their pastures and crops, and bring fruit to their trees, and multiply their flocks.'<sup>41</sup>

According to Garcilaso's account, as the Inca Empire expanded, so did its civilizing influence, as well as its material achievements. Agricultural productivity was enhanced through the construction of terraces and irrigation canals; poverty and hunger were eliminated. As in Plato's *Republic* or, for that matter, the Acts of the Apostles—as a Renaissance scholar Garcilaso had studied both—a system of communism prevailed: "Not merely was land distributed to each family according to need, but all produce was stored in communal granaries and thence distributed according to need."<sup>42</sup> The contrast with post-conquest Peru, to say nothing of Europe, scarcely needed underlining.

The pervasive influence of Garcilaso's work cannot be explored here. Suffice it to say that, aside from being widely read and admired, as well as criticized, in Europe throughout the seventeenth century and subsequently, the *Commentaries* soon made their way to colonial Peru. Thus, tales of past grandeur which Garcilaso had

"imbibed with my mother's milk"<sup>43</sup> would similarly nourish among generations of kurakas, and hence among Andeans generally, a utopian vision:

...the return of the Inca and the restoration of an Incaic monarchy. This vision was utopian precisely because it implied an alternative to the colonial order, imaginary and total, a rupture with prevailing conditions; but unlike the European utopias, Andeans developed their model of the ideal society not in the future or in some far-away place, but in the past...Garcilaso came to be a pillar of this collective memory: rather than rely on some architect of the future, the Andean utopia substituted a historian.<sup>44</sup>

By the eighteenth century, this native utopianism had acquired serious dimensions, culminating in a series of violent uprisings, many of them led by claimants to the Inca throne. Finally, in 1780, "the political implications of *The Royal Commentaries* became explicit when it served as a text for the rebellion led by Tupac Amaru II"<sup>45</sup>—another Andean civil war, in fact the most massive and concerted military challenge to Spanish imperialism until the outbreak of the wars of liberation three decades later.

When that outbreak finally occurred in 1810, it was Mexico's turn to witness a largely indigenous insurrection against colonial rule. The contrasts with the Tupac Amaru insurrection, however, could hardly have been more conspicuous. The Mexican rebellion was led by Creole priests, not Indian chiefs. Its aim was to establish a modern republic, not an antique empire. Its patron was the Virgin of Guadalupe, not a pretender to the Aztec throne.

We may therefore entertain a final paradox: "In Mexico," writes Flores Galindo, "one does not find a historical memory such as exists in the Andes. There is no Aztec utopia. The place which here [in Peru] is occupied by the imperial past and the ancient monarchs, there belongs to the Virgin of Guadalupe."<sup>46</sup>

## V. Tributary Systems

What was it, then, that inclined Nahuas and Andeans to respond so differently to the European invasion and its consequences? I have already suggested the hypothesis that the answer may lie in their historical experiences as subjects of two very different tribute-empires. It is time now to clarify what is intended by this expression. Doing so will involve an excursus into the disputed territory where the concepts employed in the present analysis originated, that of historical materialism.

Few if any of Karl Marx's sociological ideas may be described as uncontroversial, but none has suffered as checkered a history as "the Asiatic mode of production" (hereinafter designated the AMP). Expunged from Soviet textbooks during the Stalin era, the AMP has nonetheless experienced frequent revivals, confutations, resurrections, and—most recently and fashionably—deconstructions in the West. Perhaps the predominant view at the moment is that the AMP is an antiquated, misconceived, and probably pernicious notion, which ought to "be given the decent burial that it deserves."<sup>47</sup> In the influential view of Edward W. Said, Marx's discussion of Asian societies, despite his evident sympathy for the peoples subjugated and exploited by European colonialism, cannot escape the stamp of condescending superiority which is the intellectual concomitant of the West's supremacy: thus the AMP constitutes a representative sample of the Eurocentric complex of ideas,

attitudes, and prejudices which Said labels Orientalism.<sup>48</sup> Perry Anderson's assessment is much the same: "nothing is more striking than the extent to which [Marx and Engels] inherited virtually en bloc a traditional European discourse on Asia, and reproduced it with few variations."<sup>49</sup>

The first thing to be said of these observations is that they contain a substantial grain of truth. At the time (1853) when he wrote "The British Rule in India" and "The Future Results of the British Rule in India"—the two most frequently anthologized of Marx's thirty-three dispatches to the *New York Tribune* concerning Indian affairs, and the only ones normally cited by such critics as Said or Anderson—Marx's thinking about "the Orient" was indeed encumbered with a baggage of prejudicial assumptions. His historical and sociological knowledge of Asia was scant and faulty, like that of other European (or Asian, for that matter) intellectuals of his day, and, following his Enlightenment predecessors, he filled in the vacuum of ignorance with sweeping, self-serving generalizations, conceiving of all Asian countries as being much of a muchness: backward, agrarian societies with despotic governments, technologically primitive and historically stagnant by comparison with the dynamic and progressive West.<sup>50</sup> The second thing to be said, however, is that human thinking, scientific or otherwise, is always situated within a particular social, cultural, historical, discursive context, and no one, therefore, is entirely exempt from the limitations and contradictions inherent in that situation. (As a matter of fact, our contemporary awareness of this problem derives in large measure from historical materialism, whose founders were the first to call attention to "their own possible 'ageing' and their intrinsically irreducible historicity."<sup>51</sup>) After all, if one were to study, say, Newton with an eye to his foibles rather than his genius, it would not be difficult to mistake him for an insignificant, failed astrologer.

The brief exegesis which follows is based on two assumptions: (a) that Marx's discussion of ("Asiatic") tributary systems can be disencumbered of its burden of ethnocentricity; and (b) that the rational kernel which is thereby extracted from its ideological husk is worth having, since it can bear fruit in interpreting the histories, if not of India and China, then of Mexico and Peru.

To begin with a brief comment on terminology. While references to "oriental despotism," "Asiatic society," or simply "the East" appear sporadically in the voluminous corpus of Marx's writings, the one and only instance in which the word "Asiatic" is linked to the phrase "mode of production" occurs in the famous "Preface" to *A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy* (1859). Moreover, this putative mode of production is there neither described nor defined, but simply itemized in a list of the various "epochs in the economic formation of society."<sup>52</sup> In retrospect, the term could hardly have been more unfortunate, since—strictly speaking—(a) the AMP is not exclusively or even primarily Asiatic, and (b) nor is it a mode of production *sui generis*, functioning independently of earlier and simpler modes. Let us consider these two points in order. In the first place, (a) although Marx's initial analysis of Asiatic society in 1853 focused on India (and to a lesser extent Turkey, Persia, and China),<sup>53</sup> the late 1850s already find him applying the notions developed in that context—"Asiatic land-forms," "oriental despotism"—to Aztec Mexico and Inca Peru.<sup>54</sup> A decade later, he would widen their provenance still further, declaring that "Asian or Indian forms of property constitute the initial ones everywhere in Europe"<sup>55</sup>—thereby, in effect, deconstructing the antithesis between Europe and Asia which had informed Western thought since Aristotle, and on which his own conception of Asiatic society had previously relied. In a further irony, while some historians have cast doubt on its relevance to the Asian countries Marx originally cited,<sup>56</sup> others have persisted in applying his "Asiatic" analysis elsewhere.

Thus Steve Stern, for example, admits to being “heavily indebted in this discussion [of land tenure in precolumbian Peru] to Karl Marx’s comments on property relations in ‘Asiatic’ societies,” while Enrique Semo’s use of these same Marxian ideas in his interpretation of Mexican society before and after the Spanish conquest has won wide acceptance among Latin American scholars.<sup>57</sup> Is it possible to argue that ancient America was Asiatic, while Asia was not? Would it not be more sensible, perhaps, to speak of an American—or more specifically of a Mexica or Inca—mode of production?

The latter question might be answered in the affirmative, were it not for the fact that (b) the tribute-empires which Marx habitually classified as Asiatic or oriental did not, according to his own account of them, necessarily develop a characteristic mode of production such as would distinguish them from an earlier social formation: the Neolithic village community, or peasant “commune.” What differentiates the former from the latter is not so much an economic as a political innovation, not an advance in the forces or relations of production but rather in military organization. Tribute-empires arise by conquest, achieved through specialization in the martial arts. “In all cases of conquest,” Marx notes, “three things are possible. The conquering people subjugates the conquered under its own mode of production (e.g., the English in Ireland in this century, and partly in India); or it leaves the old mode intact and contents itself with a tribute (e.g., Turks and Romans); or a reciprocal interaction takes place whereby something new, a synthesis, arises (the Germanic conquests, in part).”<sup>58</sup> With respect to the Incas and the Mexica, all the evidence suggests that neither group, prior to the acquisition of its empire, possessed a mode of production distinct from that of neighboring peoples. Thus, Marx’s first and third options are ruled out, leaving the second: “The conquering people...leaves the old mode intact and contents itself with a tribute.”

What, then, was the old mode? Marx’s answer is unequivocal: the basis was the agricultural village community, a corporate entity defined in kinship terms, which held land collectively, distributing and redistributing it among its member households. Once the tributary systems were in place, such communal tenure might be obscured by imperial pretensions to a state monopoly of land: “in most of the Asiatic land-forms, the comprehensive unity standing above all these little communities appears as the higher proprietor or as the sole proprietor... [Nonetheless, beneath] the propertylessness which seems legally to exist there, this clan or communal property exists in fact as the foundation.”<sup>59</sup>

These observations can be applied directly to the “little communities” of the Andes and Meso-America (*ayllus* and *calpullis*, respectively), as well as to the “comprehensive unities” standing above them, the Inca and Aztec states. Thus, Spalding speaks of “the familiar fiction that assigned the Inca state total ownership of all lands cultivated by the people belonging to the new polity.”<sup>60</sup> In practice, land was held collectively by the traditional Andean community: “The ayllu, formed of a number of lineages regulated internally by an ethic of sharing and cooperation, can be viewed as the basic political as well as productive unit of Andean society.”<sup>61</sup> Within the ayllu, women as well as men gained access to land through kinship relations. Hence, as a Spanish chronicler observed in 1571: “The woman who was held in most esteem as a marriage partner was she with most kin, and not the wealthiest, because she who had more relatives brought with her friends and people, which was what had most value as the greater thing, and in this they placed high honor and authority and power.”<sup>62</sup> Although individual plots normally remained in the possession of a given household year after year (the tradition of annual redistribution, where it existed, being largely a ceremonial formality), and were even



passed on from one generation of kin to the next, they remained the property of the ayllu, as was demonstrated whenever agricultural lands fell into disuse: "When an Indian dies without leaving children but leaving his wife, part of the lands are assigned to his wife and the rest divided among the Indians of his ayllu who are in need, and if the deceased leaves no heir all the lands are divided up among those of his ayllu."<sup>63</sup>

Turning to Mexico, we encounter a similar situation. The Mexica also laid claim to all they surveyed and cultivated the myth of their divinely sanctioned, omnipotent authority. Their propaganda evidently persuaded Fray Durán, who exclaimed in amazement: "The Aztecs were the Lords of All Creation; everything belonged to them. Everything was theirs!"<sup>64</sup> Nonetheless, in Mexico as in Peru land was held, allocated, and redistributed by the traditional corporate community, the calpulli, based on real or fictive kinship bonds.

A brief digression on the nature of corporate tenure may be advisable at this point, since one of the foremost authorities in the field of Nahua studies, James Lockhart, has recently endeavored to problematize "the persistent notion that central Mexican landholding was communal." Lockhart acknowledges that corporate entities (the calpullis) "retained residual rights to all lands," but he points out that the same might be said of early modern Europe, and suggests that, as in Europe, corporate ownership was more formal than real: "Recent scholars have now repeatedly shown that as far as arable land is concerned, in actual practice individuals and households worked it, held it on a long-term basis, and inherited it."<sup>65</sup> The Nahua system of landholding could properly be deemed communal, Lockhart argues, only in the event that corporate allocation could be shown to be the "primary means of land distribution." Yet the evidence does not suggest "that the indigenous governmental units could reallocate at will or that corporate reallocation was the predominant means by which land changed hands." Instead, it appears that lands were normally redistributed by the calpulli only when they were unused or when a lineage died out—such was also the case in Peru, as we have just noted—and "that the authorities could not or did not interfere with inheritance as long as there were living heirs and the land continued to be worked."<sup>66</sup>

Lockhart's choice of terms in framing this argument ("the indigenous governmental units," "the authorities") suggests that his thinking is influenced by a sociological paradigm which may, in the present instance, be misplaced. As Maurice Godelier points out, the conceptual division of social reality into the distinct spheres of economy, politics, religion, etc.—however convenient in the analysis of "our own capitalist society, [where] the functional distinction happens to coincide with an institutional distinction"<sup>67</sup>—may be a hindrance rather than a help when applied to pre-capitalist formations. In the tributary systems which concern us here, there is indeed an apparatus of political power, a state, but it need not meddle in the internal affairs of the peasant commune, beyond counting the number of tributaries, assessing their productive capacity, and establishing mechanisms for the collection of tribute. The state is naturally concerned to see arable lands kept in production, but so long as that condition is fulfilled it may be satisfied to leave such details as land distribution up to the peasants themselves. Now, if the members of a calpulli, in their capacity as separate individuals or households, do not happen to be dissatisfied with the way in which their land is divided, it would be very strange to find them redistributing it, in their capacity as a corporate entity. The fact that land may remain in the same family for several generations, in other words, does not prove that it has ceased to belong to the community, for the family's possession of it remains conditional upon its continued membership in the calpulli (or ayllu), with all the

reciprocal rights and obligations that such membership entails; and nor can the land be alienated to outsiders. Revealingly, the Nahuatl language at the time of the Spanish conquest (and for many years thereafter) lacked any vocabulary for distinguishing between public and private ownership.<sup>68</sup> In this regard, the difference with Europe is striking. In fact, it would be difficult to express this contrast more succinctly or effectively than Lockhart does himself: "the dominant relationship between public and private in the European tradition is that land is either one or the other, while the dominant relationship in the Nahua tradition was that it was both at the same time."<sup>69</sup> Being ignorant of Nahuatl, I am pleased to accept this formulation on Lockhart's authority, adding only the observation that, as it happens, we do possess a term in the English vernacular for referring to forms of land tenure which fall somewhere between fully public and fully private ownership: I submit that the ordinary and proper word for this is "communal."

Having thus indicated the character of the "little communities" at the base of tributary systems, we turn now to the "comprehensive unities" at the summit, the imperial states. As an initial observation, let us note that tribute-empires, founded by conquest, resting on an economic basis of relatively self-sufficient and potentially autonomous village communities, are inherently unstable. As Georg Lukács remarks of precapitalist societies in general: "the state, i.e. the organized unity, remains insecurely anchored in the real life of the society."<sup>70</sup> In a word, the empire needs the villages more than they need it. Hence Marx's reference to "the constant dissolution and refounding of Asiatic states, and their never-ceasing changes of dynasty":<sup>71</sup> a description which can readily be applied to the Meso-American scene, and (to a somewhat lesser extent) to the Andean as well.

In its fundamental, minimal form, the tribute-empire may be regarded as little more than a Mafia-style protection racket, writ large. Like any state, however, it cannot rely indefinitely on terror to enforce its rule. The empire therefore seeks the legitimacy of religious as well as military pre-eminence: its power must be not merely temporal but also divine. Making use of its newly acquired capacity to enlist the labor of its tributaries on a massive scale, the state embarks on the construction of colossal engineering works: ritual centers, pyramids, temples, sacred monuments of awe-inspiring proportions.<sup>72</sup> The Pyramid of the Sun at Teotihuacán, for example, covers an area of 4.4 hectares and contains approximately 1,000,000 cubic meters of earth and stone; its construction is estimated to have absorbed some 200,000 person-years of labor. Nonetheless, it is dwarfed by the pyramid at Cholula, the largest in the world, which covers roughly sixteen hectares.<sup>73</sup> The psychological impact of such monumental architecture on country folk, or even on the inhabitants of sizable tributary city-states, can readily be appreciated, particularly as they would have observed these monuments on ceremonial occasions, when they were the scene of elaborate rituals and lavish sacrifices, often involving human victims.

There is, however, a second category of state-directed engineering projects upon which Marx and Engels—following such writers as Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill—placed particular emphasis: *viz.*, the construction of large-scale irrigation systems. In their original discussion of "Asiatic" societies in 1853, this feature was ascribed to the peculiar geographic conditions of the Orient:

There have been in Asia, generally, from immemorial times, but three departments of government: that of finance, or the plunder of the interior; that of war, or the plunder of the exterior; and, finally, the department of public works. Climate and territorial conditions, especially the vast tracts of desert, extending from the Sahara,

through Arabia, Persia, India and Tatory [i.e., central Asia] constituted artificial irrigation by canals and waterworks the basis of Oriental agriculture.... This prime necessity of an economical and common use of water... necessitated in the Orient... the interference of the centralizing power of government. Hence an economical function devolved upon all Asiatic governments, the function of providing public works.<sup>74</sup>

Elsewhere, however, this hydraulic function of the tribute-empire is accorded much less prominence. In Marx's discussion of precapitalist societies in the *Grundrisse*, written only three or four years after the passage we have just cited, pride of place is bestowed upon the self-sustaining village communities and their clan-held property. Irrigation is mentioned only in passing, and in a context which suggests that here too, as in the case of landownership, the predominant role of the imperial power may, in a certain respect, be seen as illusory: "The communal conditions of real appropriation through labour, *aqueducts*, very important among the Asiatic peoples; means of communication etc. then appear as the work of the higher unity—of the despotic regime hovering over the little communes."<sup>75</sup> In view of such equivocation, it is not surprising that the importance to be assigned to the "department of public works" has become a bone of contention in subsequent Marxist debates. An anthropologist like Godelier considers the hydraulic element dispensable, for example, whereas an economist like Ernest Mandel has upheld the opposing position—well aware, no doubt, that if the AMP is to be defended as a rigorously analytical category of political economy, then "the objective necessity, the functional role, of a strong central authority" in providing the infrastructure essential to high-productivity agriculture had better be placed front and center.<sup>76</sup>

Being unconcerned with the pursuit of such an agenda, the present writer is disposed to treat the significance of public works in tributary systems as an empirical question, needing to be examined on a case-by-case basis. The most that can be accomplished at the purely theoretical level is to postulate a logical range or spectrum of tribute-empires, constituted according to whether the department of public works accounts for a relatively smaller or larger proportion of imperial revenues. At one end would be found militaristic states which rely on force rather than on consent, exact tribute in kind rather than in the form of labor, and do not undertake significant engineering projects outside their home territories. At the other end one would encounter empires which rule by hegemony as opposed to violence, prefer labor tribute over tribute in kind, and invest heavily in public works not only at home but also abroad (following Marx's suggestion, we may note that this is an "investment" of tributary labor, and that the facilities constructed are therefore "the work of the higher unity" less in substance than in form). Insofar as these engineering projects fulfill an economic rather than (or as well as) a ceremonial function, they enhance the productive capacity of the system as a whole, and to this extent tribute can no longer be regarded simply as the appropriation of surplus labor without the provision of an equivalent return. To be sure, the empire still claims its piece of the pie, but of a pie now enlarged through the reinvestment of the pieces it had claimed earlier. Centralized authority is thus legitimated not only ideologically, through the mediation of the priests, but also objectively, materially, through the mediation of the engineers.

In such a schematic rendition, these extreme "ends of the spectrum" are of course only logical constructs. Nothing would be more surprising than to find them exemplified in historical reality. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the Aztec and Inca

states, while by no means constituting perfect incarnations of the opposing ideal types, at least approximated them as closely as may reasonably be expected in social science—or so, in any case, I shall endeavor to illustrate.

## VI. The Aztec and Inca States

The monumental scale and sumptuous wealth of the Aztec capital elicited a stream of superlatives from the Spanish conquerors (that is, before they succeeded in systematically reducing it to piles of rubble and ash). Cortés found Moctezuma's palace "so marvelous that it seems to me impossible to describe its excellence and grandeur...in Spain there is nothing to compare with it."<sup>77</sup> His footsoldier Bernal Díaz professed to being similarly at a loss for words: "And when we saw all those cities and villages built in the water, and other great towns on dry land, and that straight and level causeway leading into Mexico, we were astounded. These great towns and *cues* [pyramids] and buildings rising from the water, all made of stone, seemed like an enchanted vision from the tale of Amadis. Indeed, some of our soldiers asked whether it was not all a dream....It was all so wonderful that I do not know how to describe this first glimpse of things never heard of, seen or dreamed of before."<sup>78</sup>

The Spaniards were equally if not more impressed by the city's marketplace, which exceeded any they knew in Europe both in its size and in the volume and variety of goods being exchanged. Although the most common tribute was a type of woven cotton cloth, which also served as the medium of exchange, the Mexica collected from their far-flung domains a vast—and to European minds at times a bewildering—assortment of riches. As Durán exclaims in amazement: "vassals paid tribute in centipedes, scorpions and spiders....From the coast came everything that could be found in the sea; scallop shells...large and small sea snails, curious fish bones."<sup>79</sup> A Mexica tribute list for a small province in what is now the state of Guerrero itemizes over thirty kinds of tribute, including mantles, military uniforms, shields, gourds, sage, amaranth, and jade, along with the quantities owing.<sup>80</sup> And whatever their own realms could not produce the Aztecs obtained through their *pochteca* (long-distance merchants: a wealthy though not ennobled elite), who traded beyond the imperial frontiers.

The fragile basis of Mexica opulence, however, was demonstrated during the reign of Moctezuma I, when a combination of drought and early frosts caused harvests to fail for three years in succession. The resulting famine of the year One Rabbit (1454) brought the flow of tribute to a grinding halt, and even the haughty lords of Tenochtitlán were reduced to selling their children into slavery to stay alive. The bitter memory of those events lingered even a century later, when one of Sahagún's informants recalled: "this was the time when they bought people; they purchased men for themselves. The merchants were those who had plenty, who prospered; the greedy, the well-fed man, the covetous...Into the homes of such men they crowded, going into bondage."<sup>81</sup> As Inga Clendinnen observes: "A tribute empire and a tribute city exist through an actual or assumed capacity to extort. With that capacity sapped by local hunger, city and empire faced extinction. As the famine worsened Moctezuma released his people from their duty, to seek their lives where they could."<sup>82</sup>

Such occasional natural disasters notwithstanding, the Aztecs' department of finance can only be described as well-developed and efficiently administered. Their department of war was, if anything, still more lavishly endowed, unless perhaps

hypertrophied would be a more accurate word. Indeed, the lion's share of tribute was channeled into the service of militarism, either in the direct form of army provisions and rewards for success in battle, or else indirectly by financing the cult of Huitzilopochtli, the Mexica's patron deity, Sun God, and God of War. With the exception of priests and *pochteca*, it was at once the duty and the aspiration of every able-bodied Mexica male to be a fearless and invincible warrior. For nobles, the display of military prowess brought courtly recognition and favor, while failure entailed immediate disgrace. For commoners, bringing home captives from the battlefield to the sacrificial altar was the one certain avenue to economic and social advancement. Virtually every Aztec tradition, festival, or institution, not excluding the merchants' "guild" (a specialized *calpulli*), was either directly linked to the warrior cult or aped its martial style.<sup>83</sup> A society more highly specialized in militarism would be difficult to imagine.

Turning to public works, there is no denying that the Mexica were accomplished engineers. In addition to the pyramids and palaces cited above, Tenochtitlán could boast an excellent network of roads, canals, and causeways, a system of aqueducts which brought its residents the clear waters of mountain streams, and the amazingly productive *chinampas*: horticultural plots artificially constructed of dredged silt and compost (often referred to as "floating gardens," though they were in fact anchored to the lakeshore and bottom), which yielded three or four crops of fruit and flowers annually. Such marvels, however, were confined within the boundaries of the Mexica's ethnic territory. With respect to the administration of its empire, there is a remarkably widespread scholarly consensus as to the essentially parasitic and predatory character of the Aztec state. "Subjugation," Clendinnen notes, "did not mean incorporation....The 'empire' was an acrobats' pyramid, a precarious structure of the more privileged lording it over the less."<sup>84</sup> Mark Burkholder and Lyman Johnson agree: "The Aztecs united their conquered territories through taxation and tribute rather than strong cultural or political institutions....In short, the Aztecs fully exploited their conquered peoples, giving—commoners at least—nothing in return."<sup>85</sup> The final word on this topic may well be left to Eric Wolf: "in essence, the Mexica remained little more than a band of pirates, sallying forth from their great city to loot and plunder and to submit vast areas to tribute payment, without altering the essential social constitution of their victims."<sup>86</sup>

If administration was the Aztecs' weakness, however, it was the Incas' strong suit. The care, scrupulousness, and apparent benevolence with which they stewarded their vast domains—some three times the size of the Aztec empire and even more rugged in topography—impressed no one more than the Spanish conquerors, as is evident from the chronicles of Pedro Cieza de León:

At the beginning of the new year [Inca census takers] used to come from Cusco with their *quipus* [knotted cords, used for record-keeping] by which it was known how many births there had been that year, and how many deaths. And in these there was great truth and accuracy, without any fraud or deceit. In this way the Inca and the governors knew which of [their tributaries] were poor, which women had been widowed, and whether they could afford to pay their taxes....And in each head province there was a great number of storehouses full of supplies and provisions...and if there was no war all these supplies were divided among the poor and widows, the old, the lame, the blind, the crippled....

It is no small sorrow to reflect that those Incas, even though they were heathens and idolaters, knew how to keep such good order...and that we Christians have destroyed so many kingdoms.<sup>87</sup>

The Inca tribute was generally levied in the form of a rotational labor draft, the *mita*, the responsibilities of each ayllu being assessed according to the number of adult males. Considerable numbers of artisans were also employed in state-organized workshops, segregated according to gender, in the production of textiles, pottery, etc. Much of this labor, to be sure, went into provisioning the Inca army, bureaucracy, and priesthood. Much of it was used for the production of wealth to be transported to Cuzco, where it was either destroyed in enormous ritual sacrifices to the gods, or supported the lavish mummy-cults of past rulers, or simply found its way into the palaces of the elite. Nonetheless, a substantial proportion of *mita* labor was expended in the department of public works. Unlike the Mexica, the Incas oversaw the construction, throughout their empire, of dozens of large administrative and ceremonial centers. Thousands of kilometers of roads, complete with hundreds of *tambos* (wayside inns or rest stops) and scores of bridges, were built. Mountainsides were terraced, valleys filled in, and elaborate irrigation systems created, bringing marginal lands into production and even permitting the establishment of entirely new settlements, such as Machu Picchu, on sites which were previously uninhabitable. Such a massive investment in new infrastructure must have substantially enhanced the productivity of both land and labor in many provinces. Since the art of deciphering the quipus has been lost, we have no reliable method of plotting population growth during the Inca period, but it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that by the time the Spaniards arrived in 1532, thousands if not millions of people, including entire communities, owed their livelihoods to the efficacy of Inca public works.

## VII. Conclusion

Let us return at this point to Engels' thumbnail sketch of 1853:

An Oriental government [tribute-empire] never had more than three departments: finance (plunder at home), war (plunder at home and abroad), and public works (provision for reproduction). The British Government in India has administered Nos. 1 and 2 in a more narrow-minded manner and dropped No. 3 entirely, so that Indian agriculture is being ruined....The artificial fertilisation of the land, which immediately ceased when the irrigation system fell into decay, explains the fact which otherwise would be rather odd that whole regions which were once brilliantly cultivated are now waste and bare...<sup>88</sup>

Let us substitute "Spanish" for "British," "the Andes" for "India," and add terracing and other earth-works to "the irrigation system." (Thanks to Columbus's navigational confusion, we can let the word "Indian" stand!) *Mutatis mutandis*, then, we are left with a strikingly accurate account of the impact of Spanish colonialism on the peoples of the former Inca empire, an impact which José Carlos Mariátegui, writing in 1928, would sum up as follows:

The Spanish conquistadors destroyed [the Incas'] impressive productive machine without being able to replace it. The indigenous society and the Inca economy were wholly disrupted and annihilated by the shock of the conquest. Once the bonds that had united it were broken, the nation dissolved into scattered communities. Indigenous labor ceased to function as a concerted and integrated effort. The conquistadors were mainly concerned with distributing and wrangling over their rich booty. They plundered the treasures of temples and palaces; they allotted land and men with no thought of their future use as forces and means of production.<sup>89</sup>

We need not linger over the romantic patina, the shades of Garcilaso and the Andean utopia, that color this account. The decisive point to note is that that utopia had an objective basis: at the elemental level of material reproduction, the coming of the Europeans did represent regression rather than progress for Andeans. Even today, marginalized Indian peasants toil in poverty in the shadow of disused Inca terraces and irrigation ditches. In several regions agricultural productivity has yet to return to preconquest levels, and in some instances local development efforts have been directed precisely towards the restoration of those ancient Inca public works.

The Spanish conquerors of Mexico were, of course, no less rapacious or shortsighted than their Peruvian counterparts; but in these respects, from the Amerindian point of view, they differed little from their Mexica predecessors. In other respects, however, the Spaniards were less demanding and less threatening. Their god did not thirst for the blood of sacrificial victims, and, therefore, neither were they driven to perpetuate the Aztecs' incessant "flower wars." The Christians did not bring an end to economic exploitation, but at least they brought an end to the spiraling cycle of religious violence. If victory in the "spiritual conquest" appeared to come easy, this may not have been entirely because, as Lockhart suggests, the success of European arms was accepted as demonstrating the potency of European religion. Some importance might also be ascribed to the fact that the Christian priests, unlike the priests of Huitzilopochtli, were after the Indians' souls rather than their hearts. Thus when Tonantzin-Guadalupe—tawny-skinned, yet Christian—appeared to Juan Diego, offering succor to the Indians in their hour of need, her message bore a certain verisimilitude; whereas that of an Aztec Garcilaso would have seemed utterly derisible. The cult of the Mother Goddess, suitably hispanicized, would therefore survive the conquest, the wars of independence, even the Revolution. That of the Sun God, the War God, quickly faded into oblivion; there is little evidence that its passing was lamented.

Andeans, with good reason, clung to their ethnicity, their separateness, their idealized memory of the Inca past. Mexicans, with equally good reason, cherished their syncretic Virgin and gazed, however guardedly, into a mestizo future.

### Notes

1. Such observations must be qualified at the time of writing by taking note of the economic and political crises which, coming hard on the heels of the 1994 insurrection in Chiapas, have eroded the legitimacy of the ruling Revolutionary Institutional Party to an unprecedented degree. While neither the armed nor the electoral opposition seems poised to assume power in the immediate future, Ernesto Zedillo is palpably the weakest president

in decades, and for the first time since the 1920s the power vacuum at the center suggests that a military coup may no longer be out of the question: see Downie 1995.

2. *Mestizaje* (mixing or miscegenation) refers to the blending of Amerindian and European populations into a single nationality, a process which Latin Americans often view more in terms of cultural and socio-economic assimilation than of genetic mixing per se, although it obviously encompasses the latter as well. *Indigenismo* (Indianism), in its predominant or official form, may be described as the ideological expression of mestizaje: the symbolic exaltation of indigenous history and culture, with a view to incorporating surviving Indians into the nation-building process under mestizo hegemony; see Bollinger and Lund 1982; Díaz Polanco 1982; Knight 1990; and Rogers 1994b.

3. See Carr 1992 and 1994.

4. Fujimori 1993: p. 445.

5. The figures cited in this paragraph are derived from Guillermprieto 1994: p. 265; and from Burt and López Ricci 1994: p. 9.

6. Mallon 1994: 106.

7. Burbach 1994: p. 113.

8. The Mexican government officially defines as Indians only persons over five years of age who speak an aboriginal tongue as their first language. It may be worth noting that were Canadians to adopt a similar criterion, our native Indian population would almost entirely vanish into the resulting statistical Black Hole.

9. Mallon 1992: pp. 35-36, 36-37.

10. Mallon 1992: pp. 40, 41.

11. Mallon's comparative study of Mexico and Peru has now been considerably elaborated in *Peasant and Nation* (1995), but without extending the analysis beyond the nineteenth century.

12. Haya de la Torre, *Por la emancipación de América Latina* (1927), cited in Mariátegui 1928: pp. 180-181 n. 11.

13. See Lewontin, Rose and Kamin 1984; Gould 1981; Gould 1977: pp. 231-236.

14. See Gamio's comments in *Hacia una México nuevo* (1935), excerpted in Gamio 1972: p. 152 ff.

15. Anáhuac is the old Nahuatl name for central Mexico; Tahuantinsuyu (the four quarters) was the name the Incas gave to their empire.

16. For some readers, these terms will recall Samir Amin's discussion of "tributary formations" (Amin 1979) or Enrique Semo's "tributary despotism" (Semo 1973). In common with these and other authors, I have opted for such a usage rather than the usual Marxist expression "the Asiatic mode of production" on the grounds that, unlike the latter, it is (a) descriptive and (b) not Eurocentric—a terminological preference which will be explained more fully in section V below.

17. Cited in Wright 1992: 187.

18. Keen and Wasserman 1988: p. 68; Stern 1982: pp. 27-28, 69-70.

19. Lockhart 1992: p. 203. The term *Nabua* refers to the Nahuatl-speaking peoples of central Mexico, which include the Aztecs as well as many of their tributaries, allies and foes.

20. De Gante, cited in León-Portilla 1976: p. 57.

21. Motolinía, cited in León-Portilla 1976: p. 58. Motolinía's figures, as well as those of de Gante, must naturally be taken with a grain of salt, since the friars had a clear incentive to exaggerate their success in reports to their order's metropolitan headquarters; all the same, few scholars would dispute that the number of Indian conversions was remarkably high.

22. Jacobo de Tastera, cited in León-Portilla 1976: pp. 58-59.

23. Sahagún, cited in León-Portilla 1976: pp. 59-61.

24. Durán, cited in Klor de Alva 1993: pp. 181-182.

25. Sahagún, cited in Florescano 1994: p. 133; and in Lafaye 1976: p. 216. While Sahagún's testimony appears highly credible to the present writer, coming as it does from the greatest scholar among the sixteenth-century monks, and one who devoted most of a



long lifetime to Nahua ethnography, there have been some recent efforts to cast doubt on the Guadalupe-Tonantzin connection. Louise Burkhart (1993: pp. 297-208) suggests that Sahagún fell prey to an overactive imagination and questions whether an indigenous goddess by the name of Tonantzin even existed. James Lockhart (1992: p. 252), on the other hand, does not contest the existence of the goddess, but maintains that her name does not occur in Nahuatl sources in reference to the Virgin. The term *totlaçonantzin* (our precious mother) was used instead, he suggests, possibly in order to avoid conflating the two figures, but more likely because Nahuatl speakers found the term suitably "affectionate yet respectful" (p. 253 n.). More globally, Lockhart is even skeptical that there was anything specifically indigenous about the Guadalupe cult, at least before the seventeenth century (p. 247). However, D.A. Brading, who cites many of the same materials as Lockhart, concludes, contrarily, that "grounds exist for tracing the entire [Guadalupe legend] back to native sources" (1991: p. 354). The reader who wishes to pursue the matter further is directed to O'Gorman 1986, a work which specifically addresses the origins of *guadalupanismo*, but which did not come to my attention in time to be consulted in preparing this paper.

26. De León, cited in Wolf 1958: p. 35.

27. Brading 1991: p. 352.

28. The title of the well-known volume by Ricard (1966).

29. For a brief account of these two rebellions, see Florescano 1994: pp. 106-110.

30. Bautista, cited in León-Portilla 1976: pp. 79-81.

31. Stern 1982: 52.

32. Cristóbal de Molina, *Relación de las fábulas y ritos de los Incas* (1573), cited in MacCormack 1991: p. 182.

33. Testimony taken during the investigation into Taqui Onqoy conducted by Cristóbal de Albornoz, cited in Spalding 1984: p. 247.

34. Cristóbal de Molina, *Relación*, cited in Spalding 1984: p. 247.

35. MacCormack 1988: 984.

36. Cristóbal de Albornoz harbored the suspicion that Taqui Onqoy was the creature of the neo-Incas; and the latter did in fact seek to ally themselves with the revivalist cult (Stern 1982: pp. 71, 226 n. 64).

37. Stern 1982: pp. 51, 64; MacCormack 1991: p. 185.

38. Flores Galindo 1987a: 48-51.

39. Brading 1986: 3.

40. Quoted in Brading 1986: 15.

41. Garcilaso de la Vega 1609-1617: vol. 1., 42-43.

42. Brading 1986: 15.

43. Garcilaso de la Vega 1609-1617: vol. 1, 51.

44. Flores Galindo 1987b: 205.

45. Brading 1986: 23.

46. Flores Galindo 1987a: p. 20.

47. Anderson 1974: p. 548.

48. Said 1978: p. 154. Readers of Said who are tempted to accept his curt dismissal of Marx at face value are advised to consult the telling counter-critiques of Aijaz Ahmad: "Orientalism and After" and "Marx and India: A Clarification," in Ahmad 1992: pp. 159-219 and 221-242.

49. Anderson 1974: p. 492.

50. As I have argued elsewhere (Rogers 1994a), however, Marx's views on "Asiatic society" did not remain fixed, and by the end of his life he had gone a considerable distance toward freeing himself of Eurocentric biases. Indeed, the *Ethnological Notebooks*, to which he devoted most of his flagging energies during the two years before his death, find Marx repeatedly taking the leading anthropologists of his day to task, precisely on account of their ethnocentricity: "these civilized asses can't get rid of their own conventionalities" (Marx 1880-1882: p. 340; see also Levitt 1985).

51. Derrida 1994: p. 32.

52. Marx 1956: p. 68.
53. See his exchange of letters with Engels (Marx to Engels, 2 June and 14 June 1853; Engels to Marx, 6 June 1853), in Marx and Engels 1975: pp. 75-80, and Marx's newspaper articles on India for the *New York Tribune*, in Marx 1973: pp. 301-325.
54. Marx 1857-1858a: p. 473.
55. Marx, letter to Engels, 14 March 1868, in Marx 1857-1858b: p. 139.
56. Anderson 1974: pp. 488-549; but cf. Ahmad (1992: pp. 232 ff.), who points out that some of India's most prominent politicians, as well as several recent Indian historians, have implicitly or explicitly accepted certain of Marx's views regarding their country, even if in a qualified form.
57. Stern 1982: p. 213 n. 12; Semo 1973: esp. pp. 23-48.
58. Marx 1857-1858a: p. 97.
59. Marx 1857-1858a: pp. 472-473.
60. Spalding 1984: p. 82.
61. Spalding 1984: p. 28.
62. Juan Polo de Ondegardo, cited in Spalding 1984: p. 27.
63. Garci Díez de San Miguel (1567), cited in Spalding 1984: p. 30.
64. Durán, cited in Clendinnen 1991: p. 27.
65. Lockhart 1992: p. 142.
66. Lockhart 1992: p. 146.
67. Godelier 1984: 42, 44.
68. Lockhart 1992: p. 160.
69. Lockhart 1992: p. 162.
70. Lukács, cited in Scott 1977: p. 276 n. 18.
71. Marx 1867: p. 479.
72. Cf. Lewis Mumford's evocative meditations on the rise of the "megamachine" (Mumford 1967).
73. Wolf 1959: pp. 94-95.
74. Marx, "The British Rule in India," in Marx 1973: p. 303. Most of this passage from Marx's newspaper article (published in the *New York Tribune*, 25 June 1853) was reproduced almost verbatim from Engels's letter to Marx of 6 June 1853.
75. Marx 1857-1858a: pp. 473-474.
76. See Mandel 1967: p. 124 ff; the quotation occurs on p. 129. References to Godelier and other non-hydraulicists are provided by Mandel (p. 124 n. 29); for Godelier's views on "Asiatic" and precapitalist formations in general, see Godelier 1968 and 1970.
77. Cortés, cited in Clendinnen 1991: p. 17.
78. Díaz, cited in Burkholder and Johnson 1990: p. 39.
79. Durán, cited in Clendinnen 1991: p. 27.
80. This pictographic list is reproduced in Wolf 1959: 150.
81. Cited in Clendinnen 1991: p. 135.
82. Clendinnen 1991: p. 30.
83. See Clendinnen 1991: *passim*, and with respect to the merchants' cultivation of the "warrior style," pp. 137-140.
84. Clendinnen 1991: pp. 25-26.
85. Burkholder and Johnson 1990: p. 10.
86. Wolf 1959: p. 149.
87. Cieza de León, cited in Wright 1992: pp. 70-71.
88. Engels, letter to Marx, 6 June 1853, in Marx and Engels 1975: pp. 76-77.
89. Mariátegui 1928: p. 4.

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